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able him to have at his hand in one comprehensive piece of legislation the
law that previously was in several uniform laws, as well as the common
law. The Code, in stop payment difficulties as well as in other areas,
will probably have a tendency to decrease the amount of litigation, since
the rights and liabilities are spelled out more clearly than they have pre-
viously been. Parties, therefore, probably will be more willing to settle
the claims out of court instead of litigating the problem.
In spite of the obvious improvement the Code has made by bringing
together in one place the elements of stop payment law, a major problem
is left unresolved as to whether a valid stop payment order release agree-
ment can be drafted under section 4-103 (1) of the Code between the
bank and its depositors.7 Since inadvertence, mistake or accident in the
typical release has been construed as failure to exercise "ordinary care,"
the words will have to take on new meaning or banks will have to redraft
their release agreements. In a redraft of release agreements, it would
seem that banks will have to follow a negative approach to prevent any
possible failure to exercise "ordinary care" connotations from attaching
to a positive word of disaffirmance. A suggested statement in the nega-
tive might provide that the bank will not beliable for payment over a stop
payment order if good faith and ordinary care are exercised. If the
banks do take the negative approach, however, the question of what
would be ordinary care is still unresolved. Consequently, the only answer
would seem to be for the judiciary to find an area, if any such area exists,
between strict bank liability and bank failure to exercise ordinary care.
BANK COLLECTION UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
When is a check finally paid? At what particular moment does the
payee lose his rights against the drawer and receive his rights against a
bank? Are these rights against his own bank, the drawer's bank or both
of them? These and many similar questions are clearly not academic.
The fact that a high percentage of checks are paid1 does not detract from
71. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
1. "The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston reported in 1947 that during the year
1946 dishonored items represented 40/100ths of 1% of all items handled by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston and in dollar amount involved 27/100ths of 1%." Malcolm,
Article 4-A Battle With Complexity, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 265, 269 n. 31 (1952).
NOTES
the desire to ascertain whether a disputed check has or has not been fi-
nally paid. The intricate system of bank collections demands a clear
definition of final payment, not as one all-encompassing concept, but in
each situation where difficulty might arise.
With a history of chaos and attendant unreliability in defining final
payment for all purposes as a background, article 4 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code attempts to clarify the concept of final payment by setting
out specific provisions which define "final payment"2 and "final settle-
ment"' in the different bank collection situations that are particularly
troublesome. The Bank Collection Code as enacted in Indiana4 deals
with this problem to some extent, but falls short of the detailed coverage
of the Code.
There are certain general areas where the problem of final payment
is of special significance. Concentration on the three situations with
which the Code deals most explicitly, however, would seem to be the best
method of investigation of final payment. The first situation arises
under section 4-213 (1) of the Code where the payor bank becomes "ac-
countable" for the amount of the item. At this point the drawer is re-
leased on his obligation and the payee may go against the payor bank for
the proceeds of the item. Next, the payee's rights against his own de-
positary bank will be considered. The Code sets out this point of time in
section 4-213(3) and it is in this regard that the concept of "final settle-
ment" becomes most relevant. The final area of significance arises in
determining when a notice, stop-order, legal process, or set-off, received
by the payor bank, is too late to be effective and it is dealt with in
section 4-303.
For explanation purposes, the bank collection process is usually
broken down into three areas, depending upon how the payor bank re-
ceives the item, i.e., "on us" items, clearing house items, and transitory
items.
"On Us" Items. In an "on us!' item the payor bank is the bank both
of the drawer and the payee. The check is drawn on the payee's bank.
If the payee receives cash for this item, the common law is fairly consis-
tent in calling this final payment.' The alternative situation is where the
payee deposits the check to his account. The general rule at common law
2. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213(1).
3. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-211(2), -211(3), -213(3).
4. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 18-2503, -2507 (Burns 1950). See also IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 18-2518 (Burns 1950), which is relevant but was not enacted as part of the Bank
Collection Code.
5. See Bellvue Bank v. Security Nat'l Bank, 168 Iowa 707, 712, 150 N.W. 1076,
1077 (1915) ; Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 227 N.W. 387 (1929).
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was that the giving of credit in the payee's bank book or on his duplicate
deposit slip constituted final payment.6 The Model Deferred Posting
Statute, however, enacted in Indiana! and almost all other jurisdictions
in some form,8 has changed this rule. It gives the payor bank until mid-
night of the day subsequent to deposit to revoke the credit given. A simi-
lar position has been adopted by the Code in sections 4-301 and 4-302.
Some banks have attempted to avoid this final payment issue by in-
serting a clause in the deposit slip to the effect that "all items are credited
subject to final payment in cash or solvent credit." The provisional
credit thus given is subject to revocation if the bank deems it necessary
within a reasonable time. The courts, however, have been somewhat re-
luctant to enforce such provisions if there is some reasonable way to
circumvent their effect.
Clearing House Items. When the depositary and the payor banks
are in the same city they will normally transact their business at the
same clearing house. In such a situation a representative of each bank
will take checks drawn on the other banks to the clearing house where
they will exchange credits on the total amount of the items so drawn.
Under the Model Deferred Posting Statute the credit is only provisional
and will become "firmed up" if it is not returned at the return item clear-
ing on the following day."0 When the bank's representative returns from
the clearing house with the items drawn on his bank, the bank decides
whether or not it will honor the items and, if dishonor is necessary it will
set the item aside to be returned the next day at the return item clearing."
Prior to the adoption of the Deferred Posting Statute the time al-
lowed for returns to the clearing house was normally determined by in-
dividual clearing house regulations and, in general, a much shorter inter-
val was permitted.' 2 A difficult question arises as to whether the credit
6. See Briviesca v. Coronado, 19 Cal. 2d 244, 120 P.2d 649 (1941) ; White Broker-
age Co. v. Cooperman, 207 Minn. 239, 290 N.W. 790 (1940) ; Scotts Bluff County v.
First Nat'l Bank, 115 Neb. 273, 212 N.W. 617 (1927) (held that credit given in de-
positor's passbook was equivalent to payment in cash); Oddie v. National City Bank,
45 N.Y. 735 (1871).
7. IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2518 (Burns 1950).
8. 1 PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 13 (Supp. 1951), states that all jurisdic-
tions, except Kentucky have adopted some form of the Model Deferred Posting Statute.
9. See Hay & Stephens v. First Nat'l Bank, 244 Ill. App. 286 (1927) (court would
not allow notation to include checks drawn on the depositary) ; Olenger v. Sanders, 92
Ind. App. 358, 174 N.E. 513 (1931) (although this was not an "on us" item the deposit
slip condition was not allowed to change the relationship between the depositor and de-
positary bank) ; Andrew v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 214 Iowa 1199, 243 N.W. 542
(1932); White Brokerage Co. v. Cooperman, 207 Minn. 239, 290 N.W. 790 (1940).
10. IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2518 (Burns 1950).
11. Andrews, The City Clearing House, 27 IND. L.J. 155, 164 (1952).
12. See German Nat'l Bank v. Farmers Deposit Nat'l Bank, 118 Pa. 294, 12 Ati.
303 (1888) (stop payment was given effect though provisional credit was entered in a
NOTES
becomes final by some activity at the payor bank prior to the return item
clearing, or by the expiration of the time allowed by clearing house rules.
Cases covering this particular point are almost non-existent," and dis-
cussion by the authorities is in conflict. 4 If it is the payor's activity
which constitutes final payment of these clearing house items, it will be
similar to the activity which is considered relevant in a transitory item
situation (discussed below).
Transitory Items. When the payor and depositary banks are out-
side of the area of the same clearing house, the method of payment is
somewhat more complex than the "on us" or clearing house items. If the
depositary bank chooses to mail the check directly to the payor bank, 5
the depositary bank will give provisional credit to the payee's account and
the credit will become firmed up by certain action undertaken at the
payor bank.
The depositary bank may choose to send the item to an intermediary
collecting bank, probably one with whom it has an account, i.e., a corre-
spondent bank. The check is then forwarded to other intermediaries un-
til it comes finally to rest at the payor bank." Throughout the journey
to the payor bank, each intermediary collecting bank will give a provi-
sional credit for the item to its immediate presenting bank. When the
payor bank undertakes the vital activity which constitutes final payment,
all of these provisional credits become firmed up. If the payor bank
dishonors the item a reversal of all the provisional credits will be entered.
clearing house arrangement) ; Andrews, The Operation of the City Clearing House, 51
YALE L.J. 582, 598 (1942).
13. See Sneider v. Bank of Italy, 184 Cal. 595, 194 Pac. 1021 (1920); Akron
Scrap Iron Co. v. Guardian Say. & Trust Co., 120 Ohio St. 120, 165 N.E. 715 (1929)
(stamping an item "paid" did not constitute final payment); German Nat'l Bank v.
Farmers Deposit Nat'l Bank, supra note 12 (placing a check on a spindle would not con-
stitute final payment).
14. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 156. Mr. Andrews, after a thorough analysis,
concludes that it is probably the expiration of the time period which makes the payment
final. See also Wallace, Comments on the Proposed Uniform Check Collection Cbde, 16
VA. L. REv. 792, 805 (1930), where it is maintained that certain cases have held payment
to take place when the drawer's account was charged, despite the fact that the time
period has not expired.
15. This method of sending was not approved at common law. UNIFORM CoMME -
CIAL CODE § 4-204(2) (a), now explicitly allows the direct mailing from collecting to
payor bank.
16. During this process of collection there will usually be one or more Federal
Reserve Banks involved. The procedure in this case is somewhat different, but a de-
tailed analysis would not be particularly helpful for our immediate purposes. The
Federal Reserve System has set up the procedure whereby they act similar to a clearing
house for these particular items in a given area. They will give provisional credit to the
account of the depositary bank and send the item to the payor bank, and, if the payor
honors the item, will charge the payor's account for the amount thereof. See Board of
Governors Fed. Res. System, Check Clearing & Collection, Reg. J §§ 3-5 (1959).
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When the payor bank decides to honor the item, the firming up of
the previous credits is an automatic process. This is the usual situation
and involves a debit and credit relationship between all the banks along
the line. If, however, the payor does not have an account with its im-
mediate presenting bank it will probably settle with the immediate pre-
senting bank by issuing a remittance draft drawn on another bank with
whom the payor has an account. Regardless of which method of settle-
ment is employed, there is some activity undertaken by the payor bank
which constitutes final payment.
The precise activity of the payor bank which will constitute final
payment of transitory items, however, has been handled inconsistently by
the courts for years. For example, a Massachusetts court has held that
merely stamping the item "paid" prior to charging the account of the
drawer was enough to constitute final payment by the payor bank so that
the payee was entitled to the proceeds of the item." Such a result, how-
ever, is contrary to the weight of authority."8 If the payor bank retains
the item for an unreasonable time the court may hold that they have "ac-
cepted" the item and, under the majority common law rule, cannot dis-
honor the item thereafter. 9 Some courts will consider the drawing of
the draft for remittance as final payment,2" while others hold that even
mailing the remittance is not final, since the payor bank can recover the
draft from the mail if they so desire.2 An Indiana court felt that mail-
ing a letter to the immediate presenting bank saying the item was paid
did not amount to payment, but only evidenced the payor's intention to
pay.2 It is thus seen that, in transitory as well as "on us" and clearing
house items, little reliability can be placed upon the common law.
Since courts have inconsistently dealt with the problem of payment
17. Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N.E. 670 (1903)
(although this case involved a promissory note, the court was explicit in saying that the
situation would be the same if it was a check).
18. See First Nat'l Bank v. Wisconsin Nat'l Bank, 210 Wis. 533, 246 N.W. 593
(1933) (where charging drawer's account made subsequent stop order ineffective; accord,
Union State Bank v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 224 Mo. App. 375, 18 S.W.2d 93
(1929).
19. Wisner v. First Nat'l Bank, 220 Pa. 21, 68 Atl. 955 (1908) (The court held
that prolonged or unreasonable detention by the payor could imply acceptance. Failure
to return to the immediate collecting bank within 24 hours after delivery is sufficiently
unreasonable to hold the payor as honoring the item).
20. Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N.E. 670 (1903).
21. Bohlig v. First Nat'l Bank, 233 Minn. 523, 48 N.W.2d 445 (1951).
22. Guardian Nat'l Bank v. Huntington State Bank, 206 Ind. 185, 187 N.E. 388
(1933), held that the drawee bank is not bound until it has done something equal to
paying or accepting the item. "An intention to pay is not payment." Here the payor
sent a letter to the immediate presenting bank saying that the checks were paid. The
letter was withdrawn from the mail when the payor learned that they had been pro-
tested by a Federal Reserve Bank.
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as one general concept, applicable to any troublesome situation, it is ob-
vious that the Code clarification was in order. Because of the complexi-
ties of the collection process, however, the final payment sections of the
Code are somewhat confusing and difficult to understand. Once under-
stood, though, they present a uniform approach to the problem and either
change or codify, in a generally desirable manner, present common and
statutory law. Due to the difficulty in understanding the cross refer-
ences and intricate detail of these sections, particular emphasis will be
placed upon simple explanation and illustration. Since payment under
the Code is not an all-encompassing concept, the subdivisions will cover
the different purposes for which payment is defined. Particular empha-
sis will be placed on sections 4-211, 4-212, 4-213 and 4-303, and how
they interrelate in setting a point of time when payment is final.
II. WHEN Do RIGHTS OF THE PAYEE ACCRUE AGAINST THE PAYOR BANK
A. SECTION 4-213 (1) OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Section 4-213 (1) of the Code provides that a payor bank will be
deemed to have finally paid an item when it has:
(a) paid the item in cash; or
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the
settlement, and without having such right under statute, clear-
ing house rule or agreement; or
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated
account of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged
therewith; or
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed to
revoke the settlement in the time and manner permitted by
statute, clearing house rule or agreement.
Upon a final payment under subparagraphs (b), (c), or (d)
the payor bank shall be accountable for the amount of the item.2"
The payee receives the rights under this section to sue the payor
bank for the amount of the item. Subsection (1) (a) would normally
apply to an "on us" item and will, therefore, be considered in the section
dealing with the payee's rights against the depositary bank. Subsection
(1) (b) would come up very infrequently, if ever, since the right to re-
voke a provisional credit is now standard procedure under statute,
24
23. UmFoRmu CotmmcIAL CODE § 4-213.
24. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2503 (Burns 1950).
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clearing house rules,25 Federal Reserve Regulations26 and agreements be-
tween correspondent banks. Therefore the relvant subsctions, in holding
the payor accountable to the payee for the amount of the item, are sub-
sections (1)(c) and (d).
Section 4-213 (1) (c) recognizes the general common law rule that
posting the account of the drawer is final payment." This provision at-
tempts to further clarify by adding that the process of posting must be
,"completed," so that although the process may extend over a period of
time, the final notation necessary to charge the drawer is the critical time.
The Uniform Commercial Code Editorial Board has recommended,
and Indiana has adopted, a further clarification of this subsection by
setting out a detailed definition of "process of posting," found in sec-
tion 4-109:
The, "process of posting" means the usual procedure followed by
a payor bank in determining to pay an item and in recording the
payment including one or more of the following or other steps
as determined by the bank:
(a) verification of any signature;
(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available;
(c) affixing "paid" or other stamp;
(d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's account;
25. A typical clearing house agreement was set out in Akron Scrap Iron Co. v.
Guardian Say. & Trust Co., 120 Ohio St. 120, 165 N.E. 715 (1929). The relevant pro-
visions are as follows:
All checks, notes, bills of exchange or other items, received through morning
clearings, returned unpaid for any reason by city banks shall be returned
through the afternoon return item exchanges on the day of clearance at 2:20
P.M., except on Saturday, when unpaid items received through the morning
clearings shall be returned through the morning return item exchanges at 8:30
A.M. on the next succeeding business day. By mutual agreement, in the case of
emergency or necessity, where it has been found impossible to return items
through the 2:20 P.M. Return Item Session, arrangements to return these items
shall be made between the interested banks by telephone. But in every instance
the return must be made to the receiving bank and the transaction completed by
3:30 P.M. on the day of clearance.
To hold that debits and credits at the clearing house constitute final, ir-
revocable payment . . . would result in gross injustice and would evidence a
complete failure to comprehend the purposes and methods of the clearing
routine. Fortunately the courts take no such absurd position; instead, they
hold with practical unanimity, that the debits and credits at the clearing house
are merely provisional and do not constitute final payment.
Andrews, supra note 11, at 156. See generally, Andrews, supra note 12.
26. See Board of Governors Fed. Res. System, Check Clearing & Collection, Reg.
J. §§ 3-5 (1959).
27. Union State Bank v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 224 Mo. App. 375, 18 S.W.2d
93 (1929) ; see First Nat'l Bank v. Wisconsin Nat'l Bank, 210 Wis. 533, 246 N.W. 593
(1933).
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(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action with
respect to the item.2"
Subsections (a), (b) and (c) set out points of time which are some-
what earlier than what has normally been considered the "process of
posting," whereas subsection (d) is the action which has normally been
held to constitute the vital determining factor. Without the detailed
definition of section 4-109, subsection (d) would stand as the relevant
activity of the payor for accountability under section 4-213 (1) (c), how-
ever, subsection (e) of 4-109 broadens the definition of the "process of
posting" to make it almost meaningless. A payor bank, it appears, is
now able to reverse an entry which was previously considered final. In
other words, the payor bank can perform one of the vital steps in (a),
(b), (c) or (d) and it would not be accountable since, by the plain mean-
ing of subsection (e), it can correct or reverse an entry as it sees fit.
Why such extreme latitude is permitted after the Code has gone to
great lengths to set out a precise point of time for payor accountability
is difficult to comprehend. Perhaps, in the desire to be consistent, this
subsection should be read narrowly to apply only to erroneous entries. If
it can be limited to mechanical errors of the entry, then the preciseness
of section 4-213(1) will not be lost. If it is not narrowed to this point,
however, the payor bank would be able to charge the account of the
drawer and later reverse this charge, contending that the initial entry
was erroneous, since it did not realize that the drawer had insufficient
funds.
It is thus seen that the plain meaning of section 4-109 would destroy
the effect of section 4-213(1)(c) and negate the effect of the Code
for consistency in each section where final payment is a consideration.29
Perhaps, if litigation should arise under any of the final payment sec-
tions, the narrow construction would appeal to the court, but until such a
time a result of such litigation is unpredictable. If limitation and clari-
fication is not possible, the only alternative would seem to be repeal of
subsection (e).
Section 4-213(1) (d), 8" the other relevant provision of payor ac-
countability, states, in effect, that final settlement is final payment. This
subsection covers the situation where the time to revoke a provisional
settlement has expired; the "settlement" between the payor and the im-
28. UNIFORM COmiERCIAL CODE § 4-109.
29. See UNIFORM CommmVc AL CODE §§ 4-301, -303.
30. As mentioned previously, UNIFORM CoMAMRCIAL CODE § 4-213(1) (b) will arise
infrequently, but what is covered in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213(1) (d) will
also apply to subsection (b) if the right to revoke is not reserved at all.
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mediate presenting bank being critical. In such a case the provisional
settlement becomes firmed up and the payor bank is treated as having
paid the item. In defining "settlement" as "payment in cash, clearing
house settlement, in a charge or credit, or by remittance or otherwise as
instructed"'V and in providing that a "settlement may be either provisional
or final""2 the Code drafters have been of little help in enabling a de-
termination of payor accountability under subsection (1) (d). Although
the definition of settlement, standing alone, would seem to be of no help
in payor bank accountability in the Code sections which treat settlement
for the purposes of collecting bank accountability, the drafters of the
Code, by the indirect method of adequately treating collecting bank set-
tlement, have alleviated the payor bank accountability problem.3 The
essence of this solution is that the debits and credits, usually made provi-
sional by each presenting bank along the chain forward to the payor bank,
are settlements for the item. Likewise, the settlement between the im-
mediate presenting bank and the payor bank is settlement for the item. It
is when the time for this settlement expires that there has been a pay-
ment of the item. 4 Payment takes place only by a transaction of the
payor, while various settlements take place between all the banks in the
chain. When the provisional settlement becomes final between the payor
and its immediate presenting bank, final payment has taken place under
section 4-213 (1) (d).
If the section 4-109 posting provision potential is as extreme as has
been previously indicated the effect of section 4-213 (1) (c) on payor ac-
countability is minimized and the most significant provision becomes sec-
tion 4-213(1) (d). If the determining factor as to the "settlement" of
subsection (d) is "clearing house rules or agreement' it appears as if the
intermediary banks may make any arrangements they care to as to when
the provisional settlement becomes final. Therefore the limitation as to
these inter-bank agreements will have to come from a statute which
firms up such settlements automatically. One such limitation has been
provided in section 4-213(1) (c), but its effect has been shown to be
drastically hampered by the broad definition in section 4-109. The only
other way firming up could take place by statute would be under sections
4-301 and 4-302, the deferred posting sections of the Code. Under the
terms of section 4-302 failure to revoke a provisional settlement will make
31. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-104(j).
32. Ibid.
33. For a detailed discussion of collecting bank accountability and how settlement
tcelates thereto, see note 41 and accompanying text, infra.
34. See 2 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1379 (1955).
NOTES
that settlement final at the payor's midnight deadline."3 As in section
4-213(1) the payor bank is said to be "accountable for the amount of
the item." Thus the inter-bank arrangements will not be given effect if
they forestall the final settlement beyond midnight of the day following
the payor's receipt of the item. 8
B. THE EFFECT OF SECTION 4-213 (1) ON PRIOR LAW
Section 7 of the Bank Collection Code was enacted in Indiana and
provided that: "When an item is received by mail by a solvent drawee
35. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-104(1) (h) provides: "'Midnight deadline'
with respect to a bank is midnight on its next banking day following the banking day
on which it receives the relevant item or notice or from which the time for taking action
commences to run, whichever is later."
36. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-214 provides that:
(1) Any item in or coming into the possession of a payor or collecting
bank which suspends payment and which item is not finally paid shall be re-
turned by the receiver, trustee or agent in charge of the closed bank to the
presenting bank or the closed bank's customer.
(2) If a payor bank finally pays an item and suspends payment without
making a settlement for the item with its customer or the presenting bank
which settlement is or becomes final, the owner of the item has a preferred
claim against the payor bank.
(3) If a payor bank gives or a collecting bank gives or receives a pro-
visional settlement for an item and thereafter suspends payments, the suspen-
sion does not prevent or interfere with the settlement becoming final if such
finality occurs automatically upon the lapse of certain time or the happening
of certain events (subsection (3) of section 4-211, subsection (1) (d), (2) and
(3) of section 4-213).
(4) If a collecting bank receives from subsequent parties settlement for an
item which settlement is or becomes final and suspends payments without mak-
ing a settlement for the item with its customer which is or becomes final, the
owner of the item has a preferred claim against such collecting bank.
Although bank failures are no longer a prominent source of litigation, it seems that
brief attention should be given to § 4-214, since it enters into the concept of final pay-
ment. Subsection (1) is clear in providing that if the payor suspends payment before
the item is finally paid (as determined by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213), the
payee with the returned item must take recourse against the drawer for the amount of
the item. Likewise, subsection (2) appears to be self explanatory. If final payment
(as determined by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213) occurs at the payor bank before
the suspension of payments, the payee has a preferred claim against the payor bank for
the amount of the item and insolvency will not defeat it. Subsection (3) states, in ef-
fect, that if the series of activities which will firm up a provisional settlement have
already been set in motion, the suspension of payments will not interfere with the auto-
matic process. The insolvency of the collecting bank is dealt with in subsection (4).
For each collecting bank along the chain of banks this provision raises no problems. If
a particular collecting bank has received a final settlement and thereafter suspends
payment, the payee has a preferred claim against it for the proceeds of the item. If,
however, it is the depositary which suspends payments, different considerations may
arise. It might be argued that the customer's relationship with his bank is not for-
tuitous and is such that he should assume the role of a general, as opposed to a preferred
creditor. While his casual relation with the payor and the other collecting banks is a
sound reason for a preference, no such involuntary relationship exists when his own
bank fails. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-105(d), however, is clear in defining the
term "collecting bank" so that the payee under a literal reading of the provision will
get a preference even as against his own depositary bank.
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or payor bank, it shall be deemed paid when the amount is finally charged
to the account of the maker or drawer."" This section, applying only to
items received by mail, did not encompass the "on us" situation nor did
it cover clearing house settlements. The one method of final payment
provided in section 7 of the Bank Collection Code, however, was not ex-
clusive in the mail collection situation. A recent Indiana case 8 dearly
showed that revocable credit given by the payor bank for a mail item
can become final by letting the statutory time lapse without revocation.
The decision was based on section 1 of the Model Deferred Posting
Statute 9 on the grounds that the payor had been inactive for four days
and the statute made a revocable credit irrevocable if the bank did not
dishonor by midnight of the day following receipt of the item."
Section 4-213 (1) in defining when the payor bank shall be "ac-
countable" for the item does not appear to change the common law any
more than the Bank Collection Code has already changed it. It is, how-
ever, a more detailed clarification and becomes very effective in setting
down the exact moment when the payor bank can be said to have finally
paid the item. This final payment by the payor has the effect of revers-
ing the direction of the collection, i.e., prior to this time the check was be-
ing collected, whereas after this time the proceeds of the check are being
remitted. It is after the reversal of direction that the depositor may be
certain that his rights on the instrument have been substituted for a debt
of the payor bank, and if necessary, sue the payor for the amount of the
item.
III. WHEN Do RIGHTS OF THE PAYEE ACCRUE AGAINST THE
DEPOSITARY BANK?
A. THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF A DEPOSITARY BANK UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The determination of when a payee may sue the payor bank becomes
unimportant to a typical depositor in many instances since the usual situa-
tion will find the payor bank in a different locality many miles from the
payee. It thus becomes much more desirable for an unpaid payee to look
to his depositary bank for payment, since in all probability it will be in
the same locality as the payee and he can save the hardship and expense
of traveling to the payor's city for reimbursement.
37. IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2507 (Burns 1950).
38. First Nat'l Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 132 Ind. App. 353, 170 N.E.
2d 238 (1960).
39. IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2518 (Bums 1950).
40. A similar outcome would occur under the UNIFOM! COM tERCIAL CODE §§ 4-301,
-302.
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In an "on us" item the payee's right to sue the depositary is equiva-
lent to his right to sue the payor, since the payor and depositary are one
and the same. If, in an "on us" situation, the payor credits the account
of its depositor, such a credit is subject to the charge back provision of
section 4-213(3) which provides that the payor-depositor may charge
back or obtain a refund from its customer, governed by the rules of sec-
tion 4-301. While section 4-301 does not prevent a charge back or re-
fund where the credit granted is only provisional, section 4-301 (1) pro-
vides that recovery of payment must take place prior to final payment as
found in section 4-213 (1). Since in an "on us" item section 4-213 (1) (a)
recognizes that payment in cash by the payor bank constitutes final pay-
ment, a payee, desiring to circumvent the charge back or refund rights of
section 4-213(3) and yet deposit the amount in his account, could re-
ceive final payment in cash on the check and move to another window in
the bank to deposit the cash amount to his account. It would seem sec-
tion 4-301, in conjunction with section 4-213(1) (a) would put such a
change in the form of the transaction outside of the section 4-213(3)
charge back and refund right, when in substance there was no change in
effect of the transaction; i.e., a deposit of an "on us" item to the account
of the payee.
The Code covers the payee's rights against the depositary in other
than "on us" items in section 4-213 (3) :
If a collecting bank receives a settlement for an item which is or
becomes final (subsection (3) of Section 4-211, subsection (2)
of Section 4-213) the bank is accountable to its customer for
the amount of the item and any provisional credit given for the
item in an account with its customer becomes final.4 '
Thus, when the depositary bank receives final, irrevocable credit for the
amount of the item, the payee has a right against his bank for the pro-
ceeds. Where it was previously an agent for collection, it has now be-
come a debtor to its depositor.
The cross reference to section 4-211(3),4 is applicable in a situa-
41. UNrIFOm COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213(3).
42. UNIFORM CoumERcIAL CODE § 4-211(3) provides that:
A settlement for an item by means of a remittance instrument or authorization
to charge is or becomes a final settlement as to both the person making and the
person receiving the settlement,
(a) if the remittance instrument or authorization to charge is of the kind
approved by subsection (1) or has not been authorizzed by the person receiving
the settlement and in either case the person receiving the settlement acts rea-
sonably before its midnight deadline in presenting, forwarding for collection
or paying the instrument or authorization,--at the time the remittance instru-
ment or authorization is finally paid by the payor by which it is payable;
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tion involving a transitory item, which is settled for by a remittance draft
of the payor. Section 4-211 (3) (a) provides that the settlement becomes
final when the payor of the remittance draft finally pays the remittance,
as determined by 4-213(1). Subsection (a) applies only when the re-
mittance is approved under 4-211(1)." Therefore, if the payor bank
elects to discharge its accountability by a remittance draft and all parties
act within the statutory time limits, their accountability is discharged
when the remittance draft is finally paid. If settlement is made by a
non-bank check or by a check drawn upon the payor bank, i.e., not ap-
proved by section 4-211 (1) (a), and it is so authorized by the party re-
ceiving the settlement, it becomes final under section 4-211(3) (b) when
the presenting bank receives it. Finally, under section 4-211 (3) (c), if
the settlement is not covered by either subsection (a) or (b) and the
party receiving the settlement does not return or forward by its midnight
deadline, the settlement is final at the midnight deadline.4" Thus, under
(b) if the person receiving the settlement has authorized remittance by a
non-bank check or obligation or by a cashier's check or similar primary obli-
gation of or a check upon the payor or other remitting bank which is not of a
kind approved by subsection (1) (b),--at the time of the receipt of such remit-
tance check or obligation; or
(c) if in a case not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b) the person receiving
the settlement fails to seasonably present, forward for collection, pay or return
a remittance instrument or authorization to it to charge before its midnight
deadline,-at such midnight deadline.
43. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-211 (1) provides that:
(1) A collecting bank may take in settlement of an item
(a) a check of the remitting bank or of another bank on any bank except
the remitting bank; or
(b) a cashier's check or similar primary obligation on a remitting bank
which is a member of or clears through a member of the same clearing
house or group as the collecting bank; or
(c) appropriate authority to charge an account of the remitting bank or
of another bank with the collecting bank; or
(d) if the item is drawn upon or payable by a person other than a bank,
a cashier's check, certified check or other bank check or obligation.
The purpose of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-211 was to clarify the common law
rule and reiterate the rule of the Bank Collection Code. At common law the collecting
bank became liable if it accepted anything but cash from the prior collecting bank. If
the collecting bank accepted a worthless draft it became personally liable. Federal
Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U.S. 160 (1924).
BANK COLLECTION CODE §§ 9-10 reversed this common law position and authorized
the collecting bank to accept the draft of the payor bank upon any other bank, the draft
of any other bank drawn upon any bank other than the payor or "such method of settle-
ment as may be customary in a local clearing house or between clearing banks or other-
wise."
Thus, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-211(1) (a) is simply a reiteration of the
Bank Collection Code provisions. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-211 (1) (b) and (c)
would probably be approved under the Bank Collection Code by virtue of the "catch-all"
provision, i.e., such method of settlement as may be customary. Comment 4 points out
that UNIFORM CoMa ERcIAL CODE § 4-211 (1) (d) simply recognizes the practice of the
collecting bank accepting these type remittances as proper from non-bank payors.
44. See note 35 supra.
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the section 4-211 (3) (a), (b) and (c) remittance draft or authorization
to charge provisions the payee can assert his claim against his depositary
bank, when that bank has received final settlement for the item.
The more frequent arrangement for collection on non "on us" items,
however, is revealed by the other cross reference of section 4-213(3)
and covers the cases where the payor has settled through a clearing house
or by debits and credits.
In the usual case where the immediate presenting bank has provi-
sionally charged the account of the payor bank, final settlement is de-
termined by section 4-213 (2) of the Code which provides that:
If provisional settlement for an item between presenting and
payor banks is made through a clearing house or by debits or
credits in an account between them, then to the extent that pro-
visional debits or credits for the item are entered in the accounts
betveen the presenting and payor banks or between the present-
ing and successive prior collecting banks seriatim, they become
final upon final payment of the item by the payor bank.4"
The final payment section of the Code, 4-213(1), once more be-
comes relevant in this situation to pinpoint the liability of the depositary
bank. The payee now receives his rights against the depositary at the
same time that his rights accrue against the payor. Thus, when the
arrangement is one of debits and credits along the collection process, the
activity of the payor bank, which, under section 4-213 (1), is considered
final payment will firm up all the other debits and credits, making the
depositary bank accountable to its customer for the amount of the item.
Likewise, in a clearing house arrangement, final payment by the payor
will constitute final settlement under section 4-213 (2) and the depositary
bank will become a debtor to the payee.
Under section 4-212(1) the depositary or intermediary collecting
bank receives the right to debit the account of a customer whose account
it had previously credited.4" The provisional credit given or an amount
45. UNiFoRm Co~i !McI . CODE § 4-213(2).
46. UNIFORM COXMIMCIAL CODE § 4-212(1) provides that:
If a collecting bank has made provisional settlement with its customer for an
item and itself fails by reason of dishonor, suspension of payments by a bank
or otherwise to receive a settlement for the item which is or becomes final, the
bank may revoke the settlement given by it, charge back the amount of any
credit given for the item to its customer's account or obtain refund from its
customer whether or not it is able to return the item if by its midnight deadline
or within a longer reasonable time after it learns the facts it returns the item
or sends notification of the facts. These rights to revoke, charge back, and
obtain refund terminate if and when a settlement for the item received by the
bank is or becomes final (subsection (3) of section 4-211 and subsections (2)
and (3) of section 4-213).
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paid to its customer may be charged back or become subject to refund
regardless of whether or not the bank is able to observe the midnight
deadline ;4 the right accruing if the provisional settlement which the col-
lecting bank has received never becomes final.
The 1955 draft of the Code did not include the last sentence of
4-212(1) : "These rights to revoke, charge back and obtain refund ter-
minate if and when a settlement for the item received by the bank is or
becomes final (subsection (3) of secetion 4-211 and subsections (2)
and (3) of section 4-213."'"8 The addition of this sentence clarifies cer-
tain objections which were made to this section by the New York Law
Revision Commission." The commission maintained that subsection (1)
assumed the answer as to whether or not the credit given was provi-
sional or final. The inclusion of the cross reference now clearly indi-
cates that when the settlement becomes final the charge back and refund
rights under section 4-212(1) are lost. So the commission's observation
that "a bank which has become liable for an item as if it had actually
received the proceeds in money, ([section] 4-211(2) now [section]
4-211(3)), has no remaining right of charge-back or refund,"" is com-
pletely correct, but is spelled out in the direct language of section 4-212.
The point of time when the depositary has received final settlement sets
the point of time when its right to charge back or obtain a refund under
section 4-212 is lost; section 4-211(3) setting the time for remittance
drafts and section 4-213 (2) setting the time for debits and credits and
clearing house items.
Although the payee has acquired a cause of action for the proceeds
from his depositary, it does not mean that his right to withdraw the de-
posit is established; the right of withdrawal being covered in section
4-213(4) and (5) of the Code. Subsection (4) (a) deals with the situa-
tion where the bank has received provisional settlement for the item and
has credited its customer's account. The customer's right of withdrawal
accrues when this settlement becomes final and the bank has a reasonable
time to so learn.5 How the depositary is able to determine this reason-
able time is not explained, but the comment suggests that it will vary
with different distances between banks and different types of settlement,
no clear-cut rule being available for determination of the right of with-
47. See note 35 supra.
48. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-212(1).
49. See 2 STATE OF NEv YORK LAW r PVsloN CoMMISSO N, op. cit. szpra note 34,
at 1363.
50. Ibd.
51. The right is determined by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 4-211(3), -213(2).
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drawal."2 Perhaps, however, this will not be important in practical ap-
plication. If the depositary refuses to allow withdrawal and later learns
that the settlement has become firmed up, it will then permit withdrawal
and litigation will seldom arise. If, on the other hand, it permits with-
drawal prematurely section 4-212(1) gives it the right to obtain a re-
fund if its settlement never becomes final. Subsection (4) (b) of section
4-213 deals with the situation where the depositary credits the payee's
account in an "on us" item; the payee's right of withdrawal accruing two
days after the deposit. Section 4-213 (5), applicable to cash deposits,
states that this type deposit is "final when made," but becomes available
for withdrawal "at the opening of the bank's next business day following
the receipt of the item." 3 It is, therefore, apparent in each right to with-
draw situation, that a cause of action may accrue against the depositary
bank before the payee may withdraw as a matter of right.
B. THE EFFECT OF CODE ON DEPOSITARY ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER
PRIOR LAW
Liability of the depositary bank was not a separate consideration at
common law or under the Bank Collection Code. Section 3 of the Bank
Collection Code, however, does cover "on us" items and clearly makes
the credit entered on the depositor's account only provisional,54 thereby
changing the rule at common law" and allowing the depositary-payor
bank an extra day to charge back the credit which they have given for the
deposit. Under section 2 of the Bank Collection Code the depositary
bank is made an agent for collection and any credit entered is considered
revocable. The time set for making this credit final is when the "pro-
ceeds are received in actual money or an unconditional credit given on the
books of another bank"' 6 and, therefore, it appears that the depositary
becomes a debtor rather than an agent; the payee having a right to sue
his own bank of deposit.
These sections of the Bank Collection Code are greatly clarified by
the Uniform Commercial Code, especially in the case of transitory and
clearing house items and the use of the undefined phrase "unconditional
52. UNirFoR COMmERCiAL CODE § 4-213, comment 10.
53. UmNronm CommaacIAL CODE § 4-213(5).
54. IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2503 (Burns 1950) provides that:
A credit given by a bank for an item drawn on or payable at such bank shall
be provisional subject to revocation at or before the end of the day on which
the item is deposited in the event the item is found not payable for any reason.
Whenever a credit is given for an item deposited after banking hours such right
of revocation may be exercised during the following business day.
55. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
56. IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2502 (Burns 1950).
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credit" of the Bank Collection Code 7 has been replaced by the detailed
concept of "final settlement.""8
The Bank Collection Code and previous common law defined final
payment for one general purpose, i.e., final payment for one purpose was
final payment for all purposes. The Code, however, has in its defini-
tions distinguished the purposes for which the final payment is being
considered. Section 4-213(1) sets out the point in time when the payor
bank becomes "accountable" for the item, and section 4-213 (3) sets out
the point in time when the collecting bank becomes "accountable" for the
item. There is, however, a point in time earlier than either of the above
which the Code drafters felt necessary to set out. Therefore, section
4-303 was provided to determine the priority of a notice, stop-order, legal
process or set-off with respect to the item presented to the payor bank
for collection.
IV. WHEN DOES A NOTICE, STOP-ORDER, LEGAL PROCESS OR SET-OFF
COME Too LATE TO BE EFFECTIVE?
The question of whether or not a notice, stop-order, legal process or
set-off comes too late for the payor bank to reverse its activity in paying
the item involves somewhat different problems than those involved in
"final payment" for the purposes of payor bank accountability of section
4-213(1). The payor bank needs to know if it should recognize the
drawer's stop-order, notice of an assignment to creditors, etc., or whether
the item has been processed too far for such recognition. The activity
of the payor bank which will constitute the finality of section 4-303(1)
is somewhat broader than what was required in section 4-213(1) : sub-
sections (1)(b), (1)(c) and the first parts of (1)(d) and (1)(e) of
4-303 being the same criteria used to measure "final payment" in section
4-213(1); the broadening provisions of section 4-303 being subsections
(1) (a) and the last parts of (1) (d) and (1) (e).
Subsection 1 (a) makes any of the "four legals" come too late in the
case where the payor bank has "accepted or certified the item." '  After
a bank accepts or certifies a check it is considered to have set aside suf-
ficient funds of the drawer to cover the amount of the check and the
drawer is discharged from liability.6" It appears quite reasonable, there-
fore, to hold any of the legals ineffective after such certification or ac-
ceptance. Subsection (1) (b) dealing with payment by the payor in cash
57. Ibid.
58. See UNIFORM COmmERCIAL CODE §§ 4-211(2), -211(3), -213(3).
59. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-303(1) (a).
60. See UNIFORM CommmclAL CODE § 3-411(1).
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presents no problem, since, quite reasonably, this has always been con-
sidered final with respect to the "four legals."' Likewise, subsection
(1) (c), involving final settlement, presents no problem, since the same
concepts are involved that were covered in the final payment concepts of
section 4-213 (1) (b) and (d). Subsection (1) (d), however, has broad-
ened the requirement of completing the process of posting by adding the
provision, "or otherwise has evidenced by examination of such indicated
account and by action its decision to pay the item." 2 The comments to
section 4-303 are careful to spell out that under no circumstances is pro-
visional settlement to be considered such a decision.63 The generality of
this addition, however, may well lead to the vagueness which the Code is
trying to eliminate in the present collection process.
The import of the above provision upon existing law might well be
illustrated using a hypothetical situation taken from a 1951 Minnesota
case :64 The payor bank had received certain items from a Federal Re-
serve intermediary; they then stamped the items "paid" and posted them
to the drawer's account. Thereafter, a draft was prepared for mailing
to the Federal Reserve Bank. The drawer then phoned the payor bank
and requested stop payment on one of the items involved (it appears that
such conversation may have been prior to the actual mailing, but the
court said that it did not matter). The payor bank said that it was too
late and the stop payment was not given effect, but the court held that the
payor bank was wrong in refusing to recognize the stop order since, even
if the item had already been mailed, they could have withdrawn it from
the mails.
Under section 4-303(1) (d) of the Code it seems that this outcome
would be otherwise, since the payor had charged the drawer's account
and, therefore, final payment had occurred for the purpose of making a
stop order ineffective. Once again, though, we are confronted with the
broad definition of the process of posting of section 4-109. Since sec-
tion 4-109(e) permits a reversal of an entry, the payor bank might be
able to honor the stop order with immunity. If, however, the more con-
sistent, narrower interpretation of section 4-109 is followed,6" the payor
could not call this entry erroneous and so the charging of the drawer's
account would stand; the stop order being considered too late. Suppose,
61. But see National Loan & Exch. Bank v. Lachovitz, 131 S.C. 430, 128 S.E. 10
(1925), (The payee was paid in cash and then the bank learned of the stop-order. The
bank was permitted to recover from the payee).
62. UNIFORM COmERclAI. CODE § 4-303(1) (d).
63. UNIFORM CO Ea-RClAL. CODE § 4-303, comment 3.
64. Bohlig v. First Nat'l Bank, 233 Minn. 523, 48 NAV.2d 445 (1951).
65. For a complete discussion see note 28 and accompanying text supra.
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however, the payor had simply stamped the item "paid" and had not yet
posted it to the drawer's account; would this have enough finality to hold
the stop order ineffective as coming too late? 6 If the payor had done
so after it examined the drawer's account, the strict wording of the
"omnibus" phrase of section 4-303 (1) (d) would hold the stop order
ineffective and likewise, section 4-109(c) would call this activity "com-
pleting the process of posting."6 7
These and other border line situations, must be left to judicial in-
terpretation since there are so many different activities which might evi-
dence a payor's decision to pay the item that the Code does not even at-
tempt to spell out a strict rule. The crucial factor, however, is that for
the "omnibus phrase" to have any effect, the payor bank must have first
examined the drawer's account and thereafter taken the steps indicating
the intention to pay. When, after this examination, the intention of the
payor to pay appears to be unequivocal, the stop order should not be
given effect.
Subsection (1) (e) of section 4-303 recognizes the finality of pay-
ment when the payor bank does not dishonor the item within the statu-
tory time. The provisional settlement which has automatically become
final by the payor's inactivity is dealt with in section 4-213 (1) (d) con-
cerning failure to revoke provisional settlement and section 4-302 con-
cerning deferred posting. The provision here simply states that any of
the "four legals" comes too late if the provisional settlement has become
firmed up in such a manner.
Section 4-303 (2) gives the payor bank discretion in deciding which
of the items it receives will be paid first. This complete discretion would
seem to be subject to the general rule that the bank act "reasonably" in
regard to the items,6" and would, of course, be subject to limitation for
fraud in the order of payment. 9 The Code granting of discretion in the
order of payment of items represents the first statutory provision on the
point and is a departure from common law which required items received
at different times to be paid in the order of presentment."'
66. Hunt v. Security State Bank, 91 Ore. 362, 179 Pac. 248 (1919) (held that
stamping "paid" was not enough action by the payor to hold a stop-order request in-
effective) ; but cf. Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N.E.
670 (1903) (when stamping the item "paid" by the payor was held to be final payment,
entitling the payee to the proceeds of the item).
67. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-303, comment 3, uses the example of "sight
posting" where the bookkeeper, after examining the drawer's account, makes the deci-
sion to pay but the actual entry is temporarily postponed.
68. See CLARKE, BAILEY & YOUNG, BANK DEPoSITS AND COLLECTIONS 89-90 (1959).
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
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V. CONCLUSION
The interrelation of "final payment" and "final settlement" plays
the all important role in the Code's handling of bank collections. The
concept of "final payment" has a direct bearing on payor accountability,",
and on the effectievness of the "four legals."72  While depositary ac-
countability7 3 is dealt with in terms of "final settlement," "final payment"
is instrumental in determining when "final settlement" occurs. "Final
payment" will effect a "final settlement" by either firming up the pro-
visional credits74 or by determining when a remittance draft is paid.7"
Finally, "final payment" and "final settlement" might also be determined
by the automatic process provided for in the deferred posting sections."M
The intricate detail provided in the Code makes the final payment
sections complex and somewhat hard to understand. Up to this point
our analysis has been on an explanatory basis and perhaps a clearer under-
standing of these difficult sections might be obtained through applying
these sections to a hypothetical fact situation.
Payee deposits a check drawn on a Boston bank (payor) in his bank
in Indianapolis (depositary). The check is deposited for collection and
the depositary gives provisional credit to the payee's account. The de-
positary then sends a cash letter covering the payee's check and other
similar items to its correspodent bank in Cleveland. The correspondent
bank provisionally credits depositary's account and sends the payee's
check along with others to the Federal Reserve Bank of Albany, New
York. The Federal Reserve Bank gives the familiar provisional credit
to the correspondent bank and forwards the payee's check, along with
others, to the payor bank of Boston.
Dishonor. If the payor bank does not finally pay the check as de-
termined by section 4-213(1), then section 4-212(1) gives the Federal
Reserve Bank the right to revoke the provisional credit which it had given
the correspondent bank.77 The Federal Reserve Bank must then send
the item to the correspondent bank or notify it of the facts within a rea-
sonable time as provided in section 4-212(1) and each bank along the
chain would have the same right as the Federal Reserve Bank with re-
spect to the provisional credits previously given. If the payee had with-
71. See UNIFORM COMIMERCIAL CODE 8 4-213(1).
72. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-303.
73. See UNIFORM COMMERQIAL CODE § 4-213(3).
74. See UNIcFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213(2).
75. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 8 4-211(3) (a).
76. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 8§ 4-301, -302.
77. This right of the Federal Reserve Bank is terminated if the settlement has be-
come final under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-211(3), -213(2), -213(3).
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drawn some of the deposit, section 4-212(1) gives the depositary the
right to obtain a refund or to charge back this amount to his account, but
under section 4-213 (4) (a) the depositary may refuse the payee the right
to withdraw his deposit until sufficient time has elapsed for it to learn
whether the settlement is final.
Payment. If the payor bank does finally pay the check (as deter-
mined by section 4-213 (1)), all of the provisional credits between the
parties in the chain firm up and become final under 4-213 (2). If the
settlement is accomplished by the payor sending a remittance draft to the
Federal Reserve Bank (an approved means under 4-211(1)), section
4-211(3)(a), (b) and (c) set out the clear rules as to when such a
settlement becomes final. Finally, if the payor does not act within the
time limits of section 4-301 and 4-302 then the payment is automatic and
all the provisional settlements again are firmed up.
The above hypothetical case is a usual bank collection situation and
it is clearly seen that the Code well defines the exact position of the item
and a given bank's relation to the item, at any point in the collection
process.
The greatest problem in attempting to point out how the various
provisions of the Code will affect Indiana law is that there is very little
Indiana precedent on which to rely, since the significant provisions of the
Bank Collection Code have seldom been interpreted by Indiana courts.
The most significant change in the prior Indiana law when the Code be-
comes effective in July of 1964, therefore, will essentially be one of clari-
fication. This, however, is not to say that such clarification in the area
of bank collections is unimportant or undesirable. Despite the lack of
cases in this area, the payor bank especially, and all other parties to the
bank collection process in some degree, desire and have a right to know
when an item has been paid. They desire to know when the proceeds of
the item are en route to the payee, when the drawer is discharged on the
obligation and when the payee's rights exist against a given bank for the
proceeds. Each bank in the chain desires to know how long it has to
honor or dishonor the item or remittance draft and what it might remit
or charge in payment of the item. These and many other questions will
be answered more easily and clearly in a jurisdiction with the Code, than
they have been in a jurisdiction which operated under a mixture of the
Bank Collection Code and common law and which has had few judicial
guideposts to establish the validity of its speculations.
